Generous Leaders and Selfish Underdogs: Pro-Sociality in Despotic Macaques by Massen, Jorg J. M. et al.
Generous Leaders and Selfish Underdogs: Pro-Sociality
in Despotic Macaques
Jorg J. M. Massen
1, Lisette M. van den Berg
1, Berry M. Spruijt
1, Elisabeth H. M. Sterck
1,2*
1Behavioural Biology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 2Ethology Research, Biomedical Primate Research Centre, Rijswijk, The Netherlands
Abstract
Actively granting food to a companion is called pro-social behavior and is considered to be part of altruism. Recent findings
show that some non-human primates behave pro-socially. However, pro-social behavior is not expected in despotic species,
since the steep dominance hierarchy will hamper pro-sociality. We show that some despotic long-tailed macaques do grant
others access to food. Moreover, their dominance hierarchy determines pro-social behavior in an unexpected way: high-
ranking individuals grant, while low-ranking individuals withhold their partner access to food. Surprisingly, pro-social
behavior is not used by subordinates to obtain benefits from dominants, but by dominants to emphasize their dominance
position. Hence, Machiavellian macaques rule not through ‘‘fear above love’’, but through ‘‘be feared when needed and
loved when possible’’.
Citation: Massen JJM, van den Berg LM, Spruijt BM, Sterck EHM (2010) Generous Leaders and Selfish Underdogs: Pro-Sociality in Despotic Macaques. PLoS
ONE 5(3): e9734. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009734
Editor: Sarah Frances Brosnan, Georgia State University, United States of America
Received December 10, 2009; Accepted February 24, 2010; Published March 17, 2010
Copyright:  2010 Massen et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research was supported by an Evolution and Behaviour grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, www.nwo.nl). The
funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: E.H.M.Sterck@uu.nl
Introduction
Altruism remains one of the major mysteries in evolution.
Although reciprocal altruism [1] has been found in animals [2],
genuine altruism, defined as a costly act that confers benefits on
non-kin regardless of reward prospects, is considered uniquely
human [3]. However, pro-social preferences to deliver food to
unrelated individuals at no or very low cost were also reported for
the common marmoset [4], a primate species that, similar to
humans, shows a cooperative breeding system [5]. Consequently,
it was suggested that pro-sociality may result from convergent
evolution among cooperative breeders [4]. This hypothesis may
not be tenable, since a recent study failed to show pro-social
behaviour in another cooperatively breeding primate, the cotton-
top tamarin [6]. Moreover, subsequent studies also showed pro-
sociality in non-cooperative breeding primates such as capuchin
monkeys [7,8] and bonobos [9]. This led to the alternative
suggestion that pro-sociality is an ancestral trait among primates
[8]. However, results of chimpanzees are inconsistent, and
depending on the tests used chimpanzees do not [10–12] or do
[13] show pro-social behaviour. These inconsistencies suggest that
pro-social behavior may not be fully expressed among more
despotic primate species. In line with these suggestions, it has been
argued that human egalitarianism coevolved with pro-sociality
[14]. Therefore, it is expected that despotism hampers pro-social
behavior. However, this hypothesis remains to be tested
experimentally.
Here we intend to test this proposition. We examined whether
long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) behaved pro-socially
towards conspecifics, without incurring costs to self. Long-tailed
macaques belong to the family of Cercopithecidae. In contrast to
most other primate species, it is considered easy to detect a clear
dominance hierarchy in this family of primates [15]. Furthermore,
long-tailed macaques are primates that have low social tolerance
and a large dominance asymmetry. Therefore, within the genus
Macaca they are considered a despotic species with a steep linear
hierarchy [16]. Moreover, among these macaques kin relation-
ships are important especially for females, and related individuals
obtain neighboring, but clear, dominance ranks through mutual
support [17]. Therefore, in our experiment we distinguish kin
versus non-kin. Furthermore, among these macaques there are
two opposite ways in which dominance rank may affect pro-social
behavior: 1) Subordinates may act pro-social to those higher in
rank, similar to grooming up the dominance hierarchy [18,19],
with possibly either tolerance or future support as a result. 2) High-
ranked individuals’ generosity may be a strategy to either enhance
or maintain their status [20,21].
Results
In this study twenty captive long-tailed macaques from the same
social group participated. They were placed alone in a test
compartment, located between an empty test compartment and a
test compartment occupied by another macaque (Figure 1). To
avoid bargaining for sexual services [22], partners were always of
the same sex. Test-setting and apparatus were almost identical to
those used in one chimpanzee study [11]. The subject macaque
was given the choice between two slides, each baited with two
slices of banana. By pulling on one slide, the subject would gain
access to one slice of banana, while the second slice was out of
reach in front of the empty test compartment (choice A). Pulling
on the second slide also allowed the subject access to only one slice
of banana, and in addition the second slice came within reach of
the individual in the adjacent cage (choice B). As both choices
involved the same cost and benefit for the subject, but the second
choice also involved a benefit for adjacent individual, we define the
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for the ‘pro-social’ choice was compared to the control condition
in which a side preference was measured when both adjacent
cages were empty. In the test condition, partners were intention-
ally placed on the opposite side of the side preference measured in
the control condition and consequently, subjects had to deviate
from their initial side preference to be pro-social. Ten subjects,
nine females and one male, were tested twice: both with a kin and
a non-kin partner in the adjacent test compartment. Ten
additional subjects, lacking same sexed kin, were tested with
non-kin partners only.
First, our results show that five long-tailed macaques act
significantly pro-socially towards kin (Chi square tests on each
individual’s choices: p,0.05), and one individual tends to do so
(p,0.01). Moreover, overall their preference for the partner side
when tested with a kin partner was significantly higher then their
preference for the same side in the control condition (Kin: Test vs.
Control; Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T
+=4, n=10,
pexact=0.014)(Figure 2a). Since nine our of ten pairs concerned
females, this in particular indicates that females are pro-social
towards their female kin. Secondly, four out of the twenty
individuals tested with a non-kin partner also acted significantly
pro-social, while three were significantly the reverse of pro-social,
or a-social (i.e., they differed from original side preference such
that they withheld their partners access to food) (Chi square tests
on each individual’s choices: p,0.05), and two individuals tended
to act a-social (p,0.01). Nonetheless, no overall significant
difference between the preference for the partner side in the test
and the same side in the control condition was found among
non-kin (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T
+=98, n=20, p exact=
0.914)(Figure 2b). Consequently, the pro-social tendency towards
kin partners was significantly higher then the pro-social tendency
towards non-kin partners (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T
+=41,
n=10,p exact=0.031)(Figure 2a).
Among non-kin, high-ranking individuals (with a low rank
number) grant their partner access to food, whereas low-ranking
individuals deny their partners access to food, which is
demonstrated by a significant linear regression of pro-social
tendency with dominance rank (t=24.689, b=20.742, n=20,
p,0.001)(Figure 3). A similar negative linear regression of
dominance rank and pro-social tendency was found within the
kin-pairs (t=22.893, b=20.715, n=10, p=0.02)(Figure 3). The
effect of dominance rank may be due to either an individual’s own
rank position or to the rank distance with its partner. A multiple
regression of pro-social tendency with both subject’s rank and rank
distance showed only a significant effect of the subject’s rank
position (t=22.904, b=20.565, n=20, p=0.01), yet no
significant effect of rank distance (t=1.472, b=0.286, n=20,
p=0.159). Therefore, we conclude that a subject’s pro-social
tendency depends on the absolute dominance rank of the subject
itself.
Discussion
This is, to our knowledge, the first study to show pro-sociality in
a despotic monkey species. In line with the kin selection theory
[23] and similar to capuchin monkeys [7], female long-tailed
macaques behave pro-socially towards kin and are more pro-social
towards kin than towards non-kin, reflecting the importance of
their kin-relations [17, but see 24]. Moreover, dominant
individuals also provide benefits to non-kin others. These results
suggest that pro-social behavior is not restricted to egalitarian
species, and supports the hypothesis that all anthropoid primate
species may share this behavior through common ancestry.
Additional support, in the form of replication using other despotic
species and comparisons with less despotic macaques, is needed.
We emphasize, however, that further studies should be aware of
relatedness and dominance rank as a possible interacting factor in
any study of social cognitive capacities.
Machiavelli advised despotic leaders that ‘it is better to be feared
than loved’. Our results, however, indicate that dominant animals
actually provide benefits to others, while subordinates withhold
them. Moreover, the absolute dominance rank of the subject, and
not its rank position relative to that of its partner, determines its
pro-social behavior, both among kin and in non-kin pairs. These
results contrast with previous research on primates showing that
subordinates give more grooming to dominants [e.g. 18, 19],
Figure 1. Drawing of two monkeys in the test setting. The drawing shows the subject in the middle compartment having the choice between
either granting itself and its partner (in compartment three) access to a banana (choice B, the ‘pro-social’ choice), or granting only itself access toa
banana and leaving a banana in front of an empty compartment (compartment one) (choice A, the ‘a-social’ choice).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009734.g001
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addition, low-ranking individuals withheld their partner food. This
may be part of a competitive strategy. Pro-social behaviour of only
the dominants has been reported in humans too, where individuals
in a dominant position behave more pro-socially than those in a
subordinate position [25,26]. Pro-sociality of a dominant individ-
ual may be a strategy to enhance or maintain status [20,21].
Moreover, by being pro-social dominants may advertise their
dominance, possibly convincing subordinates to accept the high-
ranking individual’s dominance and inhibiting rebellion of
subordinates [27]. Therefore, this study suggests that dominant
long-tailed macaques advertise their dominance position through
pro-social behaviour, much like is expected in the handicap
principle [28]. The handicap principle, however, specifically
concerns behaviors that are costly for the actor, whereas in this
experiment the actor has no costs. Whether long-tailed macaques
would behave similarly when a cost to themselves is involved
remains to be tested. Alternatively, it may be that not an
individual’s high dominance rank leads to its pro-social behaviour,
but that the pro-social behaviour of an individual has lead it to
achieve such a high dominance rank. For male long-tailed
macaques it has already been suggested that not only their
strength, but also their social capacities influence their position
within a dominance hierarchy [29]. In contrast to males, females
remain in the same group for the rest of their life [30], and have
‘family ranks’, since they inherit their rank from their mother [31].
However, family turnovers do occur [32], and pro-social
behaviour of females may as well be a strategy to sustain their
rank position. Nevertheless, our results indicate that dominant
macaques are not just Machiavellian despots, but like benevolent
leaders, also provide benefits to their subordinates.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The experiment has been conducted according to the directives
of the Dutch experiments on animals act. The experiment was
approved by the Ethics Committee of Utrecht University (DEC
2007.I.08.103) and thus complies with the Dutch law. To avoid
any stress, the animals were never forced to participate.
Consequently, the animals that were tested, participated volun-
tarily. The animals were, furthermore, never food or water
deprived.
Subjects and Test-setting
Ten male and ten female long-tailed macaques from a long-
term, stable social group (colony of Utrecht University, The
Netherlands) participated in this experiment. Experiments were
carried out in familiar test chambers. The test-setting consisted of
three connected chambers (110 cm655 cm680 cm) that were
divided by two lexan transparent screens (Figure 1). The test
apparatus was placed in front of the middle compartment. On the
test apparatus were two handles that were connected to two
separate sliding bars. Only one of these handles could be pulled
per trial. At the beginning of each trial, four equally sized slices of
banana simultaneously dropped on the two bars, one on each end
of each bar. The monkey in the middle compartment then could
pull either handle to move the bar with pieces of banana towards
Figure 2. Pro-social preferences: a. Pro-sociality and kin. Mean preference 6 s.e.m. for the partner-side of all individuals tested with their kin
(n=10) in the test condition, the mean preference 6 s.e.m. for the same side of the same individuals in the control condition and the mean
preference 6 s.e.m. for the partner-side of the same individuals when tested with non-kin. b. Pro-sociality and non-kin. Mean preference 6 s.e.m.
for the partner-side of all individuals tested with non-kin (n=20) in the test condition and the mean preference 6 s.e.m. for the same side of the same
individuals in the control condition * indicates a difference at the p,0.05 level (exact Wilcoxon signed ranks test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009734.g002
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bar. The slice of banana at the other end of the bar was out of
reach for the monkey in the middle compartment. However, if
another monkey (kin or non-kin) was present in that outer
compartment, it could take and eat the slice of banana. After the
monkey(s) had taken their reward(s), the remaining banana slices
were removed and a new trial was directly thereafter started.
Pulling the handle that delivered the slice of banana to the other
monkey too is considered as ‘pro-social’, while pulling the handle
that delivers the banana to the front of an empty cage is termed ‘a-
social’. It is important to note that the monkey in the middle
compartment (the test-subject) always got a piece of banana,
independent of which handle he/she pulled.
All subjects were already trained for a previous experiment
[33] to pull in a bar baited with one reward for the pulling
individual, and were equally efficient (100%) in this task.
Moreover, for this previous experiment, the monkeys were also
trained to be isolated in a test compartment alone or with a
partner in a neighboring compartment that was separated from it
by a lexan transparent screen. Therefore, the monkeys were
familiar with a partner next to them, and had learned that this
partner could not enter their compartment. Several days prior to
testing all animals got access with several animals at a time to the
apparatus that was baited at the two ends of each slide, such that
all animals could experience that they could pull and obtain a
reward, but that the second reward was out of reach and could be
taken by another individual. The two days before testing, all
subjects were trained without a partner in the final test-setting
(i.e., in the middle test-compartment, between two empty
compartments). During this final training they got 4 trials each
day in which they had to choose between the two slides that were
baited on each end and after they had made their choice the
other slide was blocked.
Conditions
Subjects were tested in an experimental and a control condition.
Subjects were always in the middle chamber of the test setting.
The subjects were first tested in the control condition, in which we
determined the left/right preference of each subject without a
partner. In the test condition all individuals were tested in the
same way, but now with a same-sex partner sitting on the opposite
side of their preferred side, as determined in the control condition.
Both the control and the test condition consisted of twenty trials
that, in order to retain the monkeys’ motivation, were divided over
two consecutive days, with ten trials on each day. The subjects did
not differ significantly in the number of pro-social choices between
the first ten trails and the second ten trials of the test condition
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T
+=110, n=20, pexact=0.559), nor
in their side preference between the first ten trials and the second
ten trials of the control condition (Wilcoxon signed ranks test:
T
+=95, n=20, pexact=0.707). Moreover, all animals completed
all trials and were generally very motivated, since they almost
always took the food (18–20 times). Consequently, there were no
differences in motivation related to the dominance rank of the
subjects. Furthermore, all animals generally ate the food items they
retrieved or received from their partner. Aggressive behaviour was
rare and, if present, directed at the experimenter. Finally, to avoid
reciprocation, dyads were always novel. Ten (nine females and one
male) out of the twenty subjects were counterbalanced tested with
both a kin and a non-kin partner.
Figure 3. Pro-social tendency and rank. Pro-social tendency (difference between the preference for partner side in the test condition and the
preference for the same side in the control condition) and absolute rank number (nr 1 is the alpha male) of all subjects towards kin (open circles and
dotted line) and non-kin (closed circles and full line). Lines indicate linear regressions significant at the p,0.05 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009734.g003
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To measure pro-sociality, the preference for the partner-side in
the test condition was compared with the preference for the same
side in the control condition. Moreover, to test the pro-sociality of
each individual separately, we used chi-squared tests with the
amount of left and right choices in the control condition as
expected values and the amount of left and right choices in the test
condition as the observed values. To compare pro-social
tendencies between different individuals, we calculated pro-social
tendencies by subtracting from the preference for the partner-side
in the test condition the preference for the same side in the control
condition. A positive pro-social tendency then shows pro-social
behaviour, whereas a negative pro-social tendency shows a-social
behaviour, since the tested individual actually withholds a reward
from its partner.
Analysis
The dominance hierarchy of the group was calculated using
unidirectional submissive behaviour arranged in a socio-matrix.
The dominance order most consistent with a linear hierarchy was
determined with MatMan 1.1 (Landau’s linearity index:
h=0.7204, p,0.001), indicating a significantly linear dominance
hierarchy [34,35]. Rank numbers were afterwards assigned with 1
for the most dominant individual and 35 for the most subordinate
individual. Rank distance between a subject and its partner was
calculated by subtracting the rank number of the subject from the
rank number of its partner. For comparisons of preferences in the
control- and test condition, and comparisons between pro-social
tendencies, exact Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were used. Pro-social
tendency was regressed on both dominance rank of the subject and
rank distance between subject and partner. Residuals of each of
these linear regression models do not differ significantly from a
normal distribution. All reported P-values are two-tailed.
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